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Abstract—The Preˆt a` Voter election system has undergone
several revisions and enhancements since its inception in 2004,
resulting in a family of election systems designed to provide
end-to-end verifiability and a high degree of transparency while
ensuring secrecy of the ballot. Assurance for these systems arises
from the auditability of the election itself, rather than the need to
place trust in the system components. This paper brings together
the variations of Preˆt a` Voter, presents their design, describes the
voter experience, and considers the security properties that they
provide.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and motivation
The use of technology in supporting elections offers many
benefits, including more accurate and faster tallying, cost
savings, and encouraging greater voter participation. However,
it is important to retain confidence in the election processes,
and elections should not only run correctly but be seen to
run correctly. Recent developments in the US have focused
attention on this issue, and have raised questions about the
reliability of election equipment and the confidence that can
be placed in its correct operation.
Proposals for electronic election systems have been emerg-
ing over the past 20 years [22], [40], [10], [51], [36], [30],
[28], [14], [7], [6], [15], [16], [5], often with some use of
cryptography providing the basis for security, both in terms
of vote privacy, and in terms of defence against election
fraud. Over the past five years the Preˆt a` Voter election
system and developments of it have been proposed [47], [12],
[50], [48]. This election system obtains its assurance from its
auditability: it is designed to enable checking, by the voter
and by audit teams, of the various phases of collecting and
processing the votes, and provides mechanisms for challenging
the election if fraud is identified. This is termed end-to-
end verifiability. Individual voters obtain a receipt, containing
their vote in encrypted form, that they can use for checking
that their vote has indeed been included in the tally. Audit
teams can check the decryption of the votes. The Preˆt a` Voter
approach supports different kinds of election, from voting for
individual candidates, to complete ranking of candidates. Votes
remain private, even when the election is challenged. It is
versatile enough to allow different encryption schemes (RSA,
ElGamal, Paillier) and cryptographic mechanisms (threshold,
zero-knowledge proofs, use of homomorphic properties) which
can be used to meet different requirements as appropriate.
This paper describes the Preˆt a` Voter approach. It introduces
the general approach to electronic voting systems and Preˆt a`
Voter in particular, discusses the assumptions about the context
of the system, and the kinds of security property that are
applicable to electronic voting systems. The paper then gives
a system overview, describes the voter experience of using the
system, presents the technical details of how the system works,
and a threat analysis. While we present informal arguments to
support claims that the schemes support the properties, we do
not here attempt formal analysis. Formal analysis along with
full system analysis is the subject of ongoing research.
B. Roles in electronic voting systems
Voters: The normal requirement on a voter is to cast a vote.
In Preˆt a` Voter, voters also have the opportunity to verify
that their vote has been recorded as cast, and the receipt
provided by Preˆt a` Voter provides the mechanism to achieve
that. In practice we cannot expect all voters to carry out this
verification, but confidence in the election will increase with
the number of voters carrying out this check.
Election authority: Many of the responsibilities of the
election authority are practical: distribution of ballot forms,
recruitment of local officials, aggregation of votes, publishing
information, announcing the result and so forth. In a verifiable
voting system, most of these duties remain but those leading
to the announcement of the outcome of the election must
be verifiable. Furthermore, the secrecy of the votes may, in
some systems, be dependent on procedures carried out by the
election authority and it seems likely that such procedures
will always be a part of election systems [33]. Within Preˆt a`
Voter key elements of the election authority include the mix
servers and tellers, which are responsible for processing and
decrypting the recorded votes so that they can be tallied.
Auditors: The role of the auditor is to provide an expert
opinion on evidence of proper function published by the
electronic voting system, by checking or auditing the published
information. Auditors can be any interested party, or those
appointed by different interest groups to ensure they are trusted
by the electorate and to act on their behalf.
Help organisations [1]: These are the parties in the polling
stations who are available to help voters correctly follow the
procedures involved in voting and checking, or to act on
voters’ behalf in carrying out the non-private elements of the
voting and checking procedures.
C. Assumptions
The Preˆt a` Voter system in this paper is presented in
the context of various assumptions about the systems and
processes that provide other aspects of an overall election.
The system focuses on obtaining the votes from the voters,
and processing those votes towards an election result. It is
important to recognise the assumptions which underpin any
claims of a trustworthy election system.
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eligible voters for an election. It is clearly important that
this information is correct, and that only eligible voters
are allowed to vote, and that all eligible voters are allowed
to vote. Responsibility for the correctness of the electoral
roll is outside the scope of Preˆt a` Voter, but it is clear that
the reliability of the election is dependent on its veracity.
Another aspect of the electoral roll is tracking who has
voted in a particular election to prevent a voter casting
multiple votes. Thus the whole question of who is entitled
to cast a vote at a particular time is an important one to
get right, but is outside the scope of Preˆt a` Voter. The
assumption of Preˆt a` Voter is that any votes cast into the
system are indeed valid, and it is the responsibility of the
election authorities to ensure this.
• Chain of custody. We assume that ballot forms cannot
be forged, and that they are kept confidential between
their creation and use, so that unauthorised parties do not
have access to them. The voter privacy issues rest on this
assumption, since it is necessary that entire ballot papers
should not be available to anyone other than the voter.
• Privacy of polling booth. We assume that the voters are
able to cast their vote in private, without the possibility
of being observed. Hence we assume for example that
there are no hidden cameras in the polling booth where
the voter marks her vote, and that the casting of the vote
takes place in a controlled environment.
• Bulletin board. The system requires information about the
election to be posted publicly, so that voters and public
auditors can have the necessary access to the information
to carry out their verification checks. The bulletin board
provides a way of publishing the various stages of the
election so that individual and public verification can
take place. It is important that once the information is
published it cannot be adjusted. We assume that there is
a secure mechanism for doing this. In other words, we
assume that we are able to publish information reliably
and in a tamper-proof way [27].
D. Tallying methods
As our work aims at providing a secure and verifiable
electronic voting system usable in all kinds of election, we
believe it important to ensure that the system can be used
to run not only First-Past-The-Post races but also Single
Transferable Voting (STV) and similar ranking schemes, in
those places where they are used, such as the Republic of
Ireland, Australia, and Malta. To ensure that Preˆt a` Voter is
able to do this, we here describe a number of different versions
of the system. It does not seem feasible to come up with a
single, practical scheme that will cater for all voting/tallying
methods. Consequently it seems more sensible to propose
variations of the theme tailored to the particular methods.
E. Key Security Properties
Integrity: Integrity in the context of an election system is
the property that the result of the election is not manipulated
or altered in any way. This means that all the steps involved
in processing the votes preserve the information that they are
processing. In particular, steps that transform the representa-
tion of the vote do not alter the vote itself.
The election process may be considered in three stages:
casting the vote, recording the vote, and then tallying the votes.
Integrity will require that each of these stages is honest. These
requirements are respectively termed:
• cast as intended, meaning that the vote captured by the
system (on a ballot form, touch screen, optical scan, lever
system, or any other method provided to the voter to
cast her vote) should correspond to the vote that the
voter intended to cast. This is not a security property
as such, but it is a usability requirement and one that
is necessary to justify the claim that the outcome of the
election reflects the will of the voters;
• recorded as cast, meaning that the vote data to be
processed by the system corresponds to the votes that
were cast by the voters. We take this encompass the
requirement that the voter’s choice be correctly encoded
in any receipt;
• counted as recorded, meaning that the process of tallying
the votes gives the result corresponding to the votes that
were recorded.
Privacy: One of the principles of modern elections is the
‘secret ballot’, whereby it should not be visible externally how
any particular voter voted. This property may be considered
in terms of anonymity or secrecy. Roughly:
• anonymity requires that for any particular vote, it is not
known which voter cast that vote.
• vote secrecy requires that for any particular voter, the vote
that they have cast is not known.
These are useful informal definitions, though they will not
cover corner cases such as a unanimous election, in which it is
trivially known how everyone voted. A more precise definition
covering both properties is:
• Let A1 and A2 be two voters, and v1 and v2 be two
votes. No-one should be able to distinguish between a
case where A1 casts v1 and A2 casts v2, and a case where
A1 casts v2 and A2 casts v1.
Anonymity and vote secrecy are two sides of the same
coin: in both cases they require that there is no externally
observable link between a voter and the vote that they have
cast. Anonymity comes from the point of view of the vote,
and secrecy from the point of view of the voter.
Secure voting systems such as Preˆt a` Voter can introduce
features into the voting system not seen in traditional ballot-
box elections. One common feature is the use of a receipt to
provide a voter with some evidence of their vote, and to enable
her to verify later that it has been correctly included. The
introduction of such a receipt introduces new vulnerabilities
and hence new security requirements on voting systems:
• receipt-freeness is the requirement that voters are not able
to prove to a third party how they voted. In other words,
voters should not have, or be able to generate, evidence
of how they voted. This is important to avoid vote selling,
or demonstrating to a coercer after the election that the
voter has voted in a particular way. A receipt can provide
3evidence that some vote was cast, but not which vote was
cast.
• coercion-resistance means that the system provides mech-
anisms that would foil any potential coercer, who is in
a position to require a voter to vote in a particular way.
Even if the voter is interacting with the coercer during the
voting process, the coercer should not be able to establish
whether the vote was cast in the way demanded.
Verifiability: One of the key aspects of Preˆt a` Voter and
other secure voting systems is the notion of verifiability of the
election. This is the property that the result of the election,
and the processing of the votes, can be publicly verified or
audited after the election has taken place.
• individual verifiability We take this to refer to the ability
of individual voters to confirm that their choice has been
correctly encoded in their receipt.
• public verifiability means that anyone can verify that the
receipts posted to the Bulletin Board have been correctly
decrypted and tallied.
• end-to-end verifiability means that all the stages of the
election, from the casting of the vote, through to the
tallying of all the votes, can be verified: that the declared
election result really is the correct tally of all the votes
that were cast. End-to-end verifiability can be public or
individual, or a combination of the two (where individuals
verify some aspects, and public auditors verify other
aspects).
This form of verifiability is concerned with auditing the
election data. Verifiability therefore requires that this data is
published during or after the election, to enable the checks
to take place. It is not concerned with the reliability or
verification of the election machinery itself, since its correct
operation is checked through verifying the published election
data. Thus concerns about tampering with or replacing equip-
ment are addressed. The claim that integrity of the election
was upheld becomes a mathematical theorem concerning the
publicly available data, and this theorem can be mechanically
checked.
Robustness: This is concerned with resilience in the face
of random faults as well as deliberate attempts to disrupt the
election, such as denial of service attacks. One aspect of this
is an ability to recover from cheating when it is detected.
Another aspect is the ability to run the election even in
the face of a minority of dishonest election authorities, for
example tellers refusing to decrypt ciphertexts, or mix servers
failing to operate. Techniques such as fault tolerance, threshold
cryptography and voter-verifiable paper audit trails [35] can be
used to provide robustness.
F. Non-functional properties
In addition to the security properties described above, any
voting system should be capable of supporting real elections
with the voting public. Aspects of the properties necessary to
achieve that are as follows:
• Timely interaction In the vote casting phase, it should
operate at ‘human speed’: the speed a voter would be able
Fig. 1. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
to use it, and its response times for interacting with voters
should be of the order of seconds or tens of seconds.
• Timely tallying It should process and count the votes at
least as quickly as the system it is designed to replace.
• Usability The system should have an intuitive way of
voting—ideally, the procedure should be very similar to
the one voters are already familiar with. It should also be
easy for the election officials to run an election—as easy
or easier than with conventional elections.
• Election Versatility A versatile election system should be
able to handle a variety of tallying methods, and provide
support for different ways of voters casting their votes
(in particular, for voters who are unable to cast a vote in
the usual way).
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The Preˆt a` Voter system operates in four quite distinct parts:
ballot generation, vote capture, vote processing, and auditing.
In this section, we shall give an overview of the operation of,
and design philosophy behind, each part. The precise details
vary according to which flavour of Preˆt a` Voter is being used,
but the basic idea remains the same.
A. Ballot generation
A Preˆt a` Voter ballot paper, as shown in Figure 1, contains
a detachable list (usually the left-hand half of the paper) of
candidate names, given in a random order, and corresponding
boxes into which the voter’s preference should be recorded (the
right-hand half). This right-hand half also contains encrypted
information that enables the system to reconstruct the candi-
date order, but encrypted in such a way that no single party is
able to perform the decryption alone. For historical reasons
this encrypted information is called an ‘onion’. The early
proposals for Preˆt a` Voter [47], [12] built up the encrypted
information in a series of layers, so the layers could be ‘peeled’
off one at a time by the decryption stages, hence the use of
the term ‘onion’. However, the terminology now commonly
applies to any encrypted information regarding the associated
with a candidate ordering used in this way.
The random candidate ordering is what provides voter
privacy. The left-hand side will be detached and destroyed
before the vote is scanned, and the voter will retain the right-
hand side (either the original or a copy) as a receipt. Provided
that no-one except the voter knows the ordering, and the link
between the voter and this particular ballot paper is lost before
4the vote is decrypted, no-one else (including the scanner in the
booth) will ever know the voter’s preference.
B. Vote capture
Vote capture is simply a matter of reading in the right-hand
side of the ballot paper and sending it to the vote database.
No cryptographic operations need to be performed, other than
perhaps applying a digital signature to the receipt. The voter
retains the right-hand side as a receipt; the booth machine
marks the receipt as authentic. The encrypted vote (that is,
the right-hand side) is published so that anyone in possession
of the receipt can check that it appears on the bulletin board
unaltered.
C. Vote processing
The essential idea behind the vote processing part of Preˆt
a` Voter is to transform the set of encrypted votes into a set
of unencrypted votes, but without allowing anyone (including
those involved in the decryption) to perform end-to-end match-
ing. Three tasks need to be performed: mixing, decrypting,
and tallying; some Preˆt a` Voter variants combine the mixing
and decrypting phases, and some combine the decrypting and
tallying phases.
A tool introduced by David Chaum [10], the mix net, is
used in electronic voting system to anonymise the source of
an encrypted vote while guaranteeing that the source is valid
and that the vote has not been changed. In general a whole set
of encrypted votes are passed between a set of mix servers and
shuffled in secret one or more times by each party. At each
stage the set of encrypted votes are made to look different (see
Sections IV-A and IV-B, including a diagram in Figure 7)
to hide the secret shuffle. Both the shuffle and this hiding
are subsequently verified using one of several methods now
available.
The arguably simplest method used to verify a mix network
is the Randomised Partial Checking [30]. Here each layer in
the mixnet performs its secret shuffle and transformation of
the votes, and passes the result to the next layer. The set
of votes at all stages is published. To audit this process, a
random set of the encrypted votes are selected in a public
process, ensuring that the choices could not have been known
in advance. The mixnet is then obliged to publish proof
of the source of these votes. The votes to audit must be
chosen so that no complete path from vote as recorded to
vote as decrypted is exposed, to preserve voter anonymity.
The chances of undetected dishonesty in the mixnet decreases
exponentially with the number of votes tampered with.
We note that it may also be possible to use homomorphic
tabulation techniques in place of mixes. This was done for
example in Scratch and Vote [2], which uses Preˆt a` Voter
ballots but with homomorphic tabulation.
D. Auditing
In order for the voters, officials, candidates etc. to be
convinced that the published tally corresponds to the votes
cast, they need to be able to check that the mixing, decrypting
and tallying phases have all been performed correctly. Every
cryptographically protected operation here publishes enough
information for voters (and others) to be able to verify cor-
rectness. The details vary: the information may consist of a
zero-knowledge proof; it may consist of information enabling
anyone to reverse the operation that has been performed and
confirm that the output can be transformed back into the input.
In many forms of Preˆt a` Voter, the decryption phase results
in publication of all of the (anonymized) unencrypted votes;
in such cases, the tallying operation can be publicly verified
without any further information.
End-to-end verifiability results from voters being able to
verify that their intent has been properly recorded, and public
auditors being able to verify that the votes as a whole have
been counted as recorded.
III. VOTER EXPERIENCE
In this section we describe what a voter would experience
when using a Preˆt a` Voter voting system. There are several
developments of the Preˆt a` Voter voting system, which give
rise to variations in the details of the voting experience, but
they have common features.
The heart of the voting process provides a way of obtaining
an encrypted vote from a voter. This requires the information
required to vote (normally the list of candidates) to be pre-
sented to the voter, so that the vote can be captured in an
encrypted form. The information is destroyed once the voter
has made use of it to cast the vote, so the vote can then only
be understood via decryption.
A. Ballot Form Layout
The standard Preˆt a` Voter ballot form has been pictured in
Figure 1. It is designed so that the two halves of the form can
be separated, for example by means of a perforation running
down the middle of the ballot form. This enables the plaintext
information concerning the candidate list to be removed once
the vote has been cast, leaving the vote in purely encrypted
form. A vote on the remaining half of the form, together with
the encrypted information, comprises an encrypted vote.
All elections that place votes against candidates can be run
using this ballot form: whether votes involve selection of a
single candidate, a number of candidates, or a ranked list
of candidates, and however these will be tallied. Different
underlying decryption mechanisms are required in different
cases, but from the voters’ perspective all such elections can be
supported with this ballot form, and votes cast in the traditional
way.
The original Preˆt a` Voter scheme [47], [12] proposed the
use of a particular form of permutation: cyclic shifts of the
candidate list, whereby the list is always in the same order,
but can start at any arbitrary point, and wrap around. This is
appropriate for capturing a vote against a single candidate,
since the position of the vote gives no information about
the candidate voted for, but it is not appropriate where votes
are cast against more than one candidate, since the relative
positions of candidates, and likely combinations of votes,
will leak some information about the vote cast from the
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Fig. 3. Detaching the candidate list
pattern of votes recorded on the right-hand side. In fact,
the scheme generalises to allow arbitrary permutations of the
candidate list, and can then be used to record votes for multiple
candidates as well.
The re-encryption schemes of [50], [48] are only able to
handle cyclic shifts of candidate lists, because of the properties
of their respective cryptographic mechanisms used in process-
ing the votes. Hence they are only appropriate for supporting
votes for a single candidate. However, later developments [55],
[54], [26] do support arbitrary permutations of candidate lists.
This requires an onion for each candidate; these might appear
on the ballot form on the right hand side against the candidate
names, but the information could equally well be at the bottom
of the form and associated with the votes after they have been
cast. From the voter’s point of view this can be set up to look
exactly like the earlier schemes.
B. Vote Casting
The voter casts a vote by filling in the boxes on the right
hand side of the ballot form, against the chosen names. If a
single name is to be chosen, an ‘×’, tick or other mark is
placed against the name. If a preference list of names is to
be chosen, then the appropriate preferences are placed against
the chosen names, in the conventional way. This is pictured
in Figure 2.
The two halves of the ballot form are then separated, as
pictured in Figure 3. The left-hand half, consisting of the list of
candidates, is destroyed. Its destruction is necessary to ensure
that the voter cannot later prove how she voted, and hence
provides resistance to coercion and vote-selling. Thus the voter
must be required to destroy the left-hand half as part of the
voting process.
The right-hand half of the ballot form, pictured in Figure 4,
consists of the vote to be cast. It will be first scanned into the
Fig. 4. The scanned vote and receipt
Preˆt a` Voter voting system, and then signed. After that, the
voter can retain it as the receipt of the vote cast. Note that the
help organisations in the polling station are supposed to help
the voter to check that the signature in her receipt is valid.
This provides protection against election challenges with fake
receipts—that is, receipts for votes which were never cast.
The scanning system will need to extract the position of the
vote or preferences on the sheet, and the encryption of the list
ordering, in order to process the vote.
A possible variation on the receipt is for the Preˆt a` Voter
system to print its own (signed) record of its scanned infor-
mation, and provide this as a receipt. By matching this with
the original vote, this will allow the voter to confirm that the
information on the form has been correctly understood by the
system.
C. Audit of ballot forms
Voters may wish to check that the order of candidates
claimed to be encrypted on the right-hand side does indeed
correspond to the list printed on the left-hand side. If this
were not the case then a vote cast for one candidate may be
considered after decryption as a vote for a different candidate.
To provide such reassurance, voters may elect to ‘audit’ a
ballot form. This involves removing the left-hand side of the
ballot form, and asking the system to decrypt the candidate
list from the onion on the right-hand side. The voter can then
check that the decrypted list matches the list of candidates
printed on the left-hand side. In principle, this audit can
be carried out as often as the voter wishes. This gives the
voter confidence that the ballot forms have been correctly
constructed.
However, the voter is not allowed to cast a vote on a
decrypted ballot form. Once the candidate list associated
with a onion is known, vote privacy, and hence resistance to
coercion and vote-selling, is lost. The audit process gives an
individual voter confidence that the ballot forms are correctly
constructed, but does not allow her to check the ballot form
that she is using to cast the vote.
An alternative approach, proposed in [50], is to print a ballot
form on each side of the ballot paper, in such a way that
the removal of the candidate list on one side does not affect
the information on the other side. The two ballot forms must
be independent. The voter chooses arbitrarily one side of the
ballot form on which to cast the vote, marks her vote in the
usual way, and detaches the list of candidates so the vote can
6be cast. The other side still constitutes a complete ballot form,
and can be audited, checking that the decrypted candidate list
corresponds to the printed candidate list.
D. Verifying the vote
Votes that have been cast are published on a bulletin board.
Voters can check that the information on their receipt (the vote
and the onion) appears on the board, and this gives them the
assurance that their vote was indeed accepted into the system
as a cast vote. If their vote does not appear on the board, or
appears incorrectly, then they can use their receipt to challenge
the election, since it provides evidence of a vote that has not
been included in the tally. Voters are thus expected to retain
their receipts as a protection against their vote being changed.
A verifiable encrypted paper audit trail [34] or voter-verifiable
paper audit trail [35] can also be used to provide additional
assurance.
The process of decrypting the votes is also subject to audit
processes, but the voter will not be directly involved in this.
However, it will be known that agents from all parties, and
from neutral organizations, participate in the auditing process,
and this should be sufficient to provide confidence in the
decryption process. This reflects current practice, whereby
voters are aware that there are audit or checking processes that
they have confidence in, but do not participate in directly. Once
the votes are decrypted they can be made public, enabling the
vote tally and election result to be checked by any interested
voter.
E. Pre-print/on-demand printing of ballot forms
Secrecy of the ballot relies on the fact that the list of
candidates cannot be deduced from the onion without the
ability to decrypt. However, the ballot form itself, when entire,
provides an association between the onion and the candidate
list. This means that ballot forms need to be managed carefully,
and the chain of custody between the creation of a ballot form
and its use in a polling station needs to be trusted.
An alternative approach is to print ballot forms at the
point they are needed. This can be achieved by providing a
ballot form with the candidate list encrypted in two different
ways: one which can be decrypted in the polling station, and
one which can be decrypted by the Preˆt a` Voter tellers as
previously. The list of candidates is then printed on demand,
when the ballot form needs to be used at the polling station.
This addresses the chain of custody issues, and provides
additional assurance to the voter that external parties cannot
have seen the candidate list associated with their particular
ballot form or receipt. Ballot forms can be audited in the same
way as previously, by asking for the candidate list associated
with the right-hand side to be revealed, and checking that it
matches the left-hand side.
With the exception of having the ballot form printed on
demand as a voter wishes to vote, the voting experience—
casting a vote, auditing a ballot form, separating a ballot
form into two halves, checking the vote—is identical with the
experience of using a pre-printed ballot form.
F. Summary
From a voter’s perspective, the voting experience consists
of several parts, though in fact only the first part, casting the
vote, is absolutely required for participation. The remaining
parts are optional for the voter to obtain additional assurances
in the integrity of the election, though it is to be hoped that
sufficient users would exercise these options to deter attempts
to subvert the election.
• casting the vote: filling out a ballot form (either pre-
printed, or printed on demand), removing the left-hand
side, having the right-hand side scanned into the voting
system;
• optionally auditing ballot forms, checking that the de-
crypted candidate lists correspond to the candidate lists
already printed;
• optionally retaining the receipt of the vote. This might
be the original scanned right-hand half, or it might be
generated by the voting system and checked in the polling
station against the original vote;
• optionally checking (some time later) that the vote has
been included in the list of cast votes, by checking
the receipt against the web bulletin board it should be
published on;
• optionally checking the tallying, and the election result,
from the published decrypted votes.
The deliberate aim is to keep as much of the complexity of
the system, required to ensure the security of the election and
described in the rest of this paper, away from the voter. The
voter’s experience needs to be kept as simple as possible, and
the demands on the voter should be kept to a minimum.
IV. TECHNICAL DETAILS
In this section, we explain how to generate the ballot forms
and, after voters have cast their votes, how these votes can be
tallied. The procedures in this section are only implemented
by the election authorities and they are transparent to ordinary
voters, and so we call them the back-ends of the election
systems. We first discuss how the back-ends can be designed
using decryption mixnets, and then we show how they can
be designed using re-encryption mixnets without affecting the
voter experience.
A. Back-ends by decryption mixnets
The decryption mixnet was introduced by David Chaum
in [10]. We explain how this mixnet can be used to design the
back-ends of Preˆt a` Voter. The involved parties are an election
authority who generates the ballot forms and a number of mix
servers who shuffle and decrypt the received votes. We discuss
later how the election authority may be distributed.
1) Ballot generation: Suppose there are k mix servers
in the election system. Before generating the ballot forms,
each mix server generates two RSA key pairs. They publish
their public keys and distribute their private keys among
all other mix servers in a threshold fashion [52]. All ballot
forms are generated by an election authority. For each ballot,
2k germ values (g0, g1, . . . , g2k−1) are randomly selected by
7this authority. Then the onion is encrypted using each mix
server’s public keys iteratively as Di+1 = {gi, Di}PKi , for
i = 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1. The final output D2k is the onion
D2k = {g2k−1, {. . . , {g1, {g0, D0}PK0}PK1 · · ·}PK2k−2}2k−1
At the same time, the candidate list in alphabetical order is
cyclically shifted by θ =
∑2k−1
i=0 di (mod v), where di =
hash(gi) (mod v), and v denotes the number of candidates.
For each ballot form, the candidate list and its corresponding
onion will be printed onto the ballot form by the election
authority. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. A ballot form example
2) Voter experience: A voter first marks the choice against
her preferred candidate, as shown in Figure 6. Then the left
hand column of the ballot will be detached and destroyed. This
voter’s vote is only the right column of the ballot in Figure 6,
which contains her mark rj,2k and the onion Dj,2k.
Fig. 6. A marked ballot form
3) Ballot tallying: In the tallying stage, all received ballots
are shuffled and decrypted by a sequence of mix servers.
Suppose the inputs to the ith mix server Si are a list L2i =
{(r1,2i, D1,2i), . . . , (rn,2i, Dn,2i)}. For each value pair in the
list, Si will behave as follows:
1) Let j denote the ballot serial number, for j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Si first decrypts Dj,2i using her private key SK2i as
{Dj,2i}SK2i = (gj,2i−1, Dj,2i−1).
2) Then Si applies the hash function to the germ value as
dj,2i−1 = hash(gj,2i−1) (mod v).
3) Si calculates the cyclical shift as rj,2i−1 = rj,2i−dj,2i−1
(mod v).
4) Now Si obtains a list
{(r1,2i−1, D1,2i−1), . . . , (rn,2i−1, Dn,2i−1)}. Si then
sorts the list in the lexical order, resulting a list L2i−1 =
{(rpi(1),2i−1, Dpi(1),2i−1), . . . , (rpi(n),2i−1, Dpi(n),2i−1)}.
Si repeats the above procedures again, outputting the list
L2i−2 to the next mix server. The following mix servers
execute similarly. The last mix server’s output is the decrypted
votes.
4) Audit the ballot tallying phase: The above ballot tally-
ing phase can be publicly verified using Randomised Partial
Checking (RPC) [30]. The basic idea of RPC is to provide
strong evidence that the mixnet is correctly implemented.
By using RPC, each mix server needs to implement two
shuffles and every two adjacent mix servers are paired, as
show in Figure 7. To audit a mixnet, each mix server pair
should be verified separately as:
Fig. 7. Randomised Partial Checking
1) For the left mix server, the auditor will go down the
middle column and randomly assign half the units L
and the other half R.
2) For units assigned L, the auditor requires the left mix
server to reveal the corresponding links in its first shuffle
(incoming links).
3) For units assigned R, the auditor requires the left mix
server to reveal the corresponding links in its second
shuffle (outgoing links).
4) For the right mix server, for exactly half of its received
inputs, their incoming links have already been revealed.
We denote that these units are in the group G1 while
other units are in the group G2. Then the auditor
randomly selects half of the units in G1 and half of the
units in G2 and requires the right mix server to reveal
its outgoing links.
5) In the last shuffle, for the units whose incoming links
have not been revealed, the right mix server is required
to reveal its outgoing links.
When considering the two mix servers as a pair, the above
auditing process will not reveal any information about how
these two mix servers have shuffled the mixes. A proof of
security of this process appears in [25]. A single round of veri-
fication will provide strong evidence that both mix servers have
behaved correctly. Note that the random challenges can be
generated by a number of sources, e.g., lottery style choosing
8of elements or using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics [20]. In some
cases it may be necessary to include shuffle commitments to
deny the server any freedom in how it reveals links under
audit. Most variants of Preˆt a` Voter ensure that all receipts
have distinct plaintexts, which removes the need for such
shuffle commitments. The distinct plaintext requirement needs
to be enforced by running Plaintext Equivalence Tests [9], [29]
across the posted receipts. This needs to be done in any case
to counter ballot doubling attacks against privacy.
5) Handling ranked elections: The above protocol also can
be implemented in ranked elections. However, the candidate
list in the ballot form needs to be randomly permuted instead
of just cyclically shifted; otherwise, a receipt might leak in-
formation about the vote. Therefore, when generating a ballot
form, the election authority should use the germ values to
determine a random permutation as φi = f(hash(gi)), where
hash is a collision-resistant hash function and f is a suitable,
unbiased mapping from the domain of the hash function to
the set of permutation on the set of candidates. The total
permutation can be represented as φ = φ0 ◦ φ1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ2k−1.
Note that although this avoids information leakage from the
receipt, it does not avoid the so-called Italian attack, in which
lower-ranked preferences are used as a covert channel to
provide a mechanism for coercion.
B. Back-ends by re-encryption mixnets
We now discuss how the ballots can be generated using re-
encryption mixnets without affecting the voter experience. The
involved parties are a set of election authorities, called clerks,
who generate the ballot forms, a sequence of mix servers who
shuffle and re-encrypt the received votes, and a number of
tellers who decrypt the election result in a threshold fashion.
1) Key generation: The back-ends by re-encryption mixnets
can be implemented using either exponential ElGamal [19]
or Paillier [41]. Here, we only introduce the ones based on
ElGamal, but it is a trivial modification to replace the ElGamal
cipher with Paillier.
Suppose the ElGamal public parameters (α, γ, p, q) are
made public in advance, where p and q are large primes such
that q|p−1, and α, γ are generators of Gq which is a subgroup
of Z∗p with order q. A set of tellers first generate a secret
key xT ∈ Zq in a threshold fashion [42], [24]. (Note that
if Paillier is applied in the mixnets, the techniques in [52]
enable the tellers to generate the key pair in a threshold
fashion, and the techniques in [21] can be used to decrypt the
Paillier ciphertexts in a threshold fashion.) They publish the
corresponding public key βT = gxT . Furthermore, the voting
machine randomly selects a private key xR ∈ Zq and reveals
its public key βR = gxR . To ensure robustness, its private
key needs to be distributed among the threshold tellers using
verifiable secret sharing [18].
2) Ballot generation: An initial clerk C0 randomly selects
a batch of initial seeds s0i from a binomial distribution centred
around 0 and standard deviation σ, where σ can be chosen to
be order of v, the number of candidates. Because the exponen-
tial ElGamal cipher is not a trapdoor function, this requirement
ensures that m can be retrieved from hm efficiently; if Paillier
is used, this requirement is not necessary. C0 then generates
a batch of onion pairs
(αx
0
i , βR
x0i · γ−s0i ), (αy0i , βT y
0
i · γ−s0i )
where the blinding factors x0i , y
0
i are randomly drawn from
Zq.
After that, the remaining l clerks perform as follows: each
clerk takes the batch of onion pairs output by the previous
clerk and injects fresh entropy into the seed values. For each
onion pair, the same entropy is injected into the seed value of
both onions. We suppose the batch of onions pairs received
by the clerk Cj is
(αx
j−1
i , βR
xj−1
i · γ−sj−1i ), (αyj−1i , βT y
j−1
i · γ−sj−1i )
Cj randomly selects a batch of seeds s¯
j
i from the same
binomial distribution centred around 0 and σ. Then Cj
calculates her output batch of the onion pairs as
(αx¯
j
i , βR
x¯j
i · γ−s¯ji ), (αy¯ji , βT y¯
j
i · γ−s¯ji )
↓
(αx
j−1
i · αx¯ji , βRx
j−1
i · βRx¯
j
i · γ−sj−1i · γ−s¯ji ), (αyj−1i · αy¯ji , βT y
j−1
i · βT y¯
j
i · γ−sj−1i · γ−s¯ji )
↓
(αx
j−1
i
+x¯j
i , βR
xj−1
i
+x¯j
i · γ−(sj−1i +s¯ji )), (αyj−1i +y¯ji , βT y
j−1
i
+y¯j
i · γ−(sj−1i +s¯ji ))
↓
(αx
j
i , βR
xj
i · γ−sji ), (αyji , βT y
j
i · γ−sji )
where the blinding values x¯ji , y¯
j
i are randomly drawn from Zq ,
and
xji = x
j−1
i + x¯
j
i (mod q)
yji = y
j−1
i + y¯
j
i (mod q)
sji = s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i (mod q)
Finally, the last clerk Cl will output a batch of onion pairs
(αxi , βRxi · γ−si), (αyi , βT yi · γ−si)
where
xi = xli = x
0
i +
l∑
j=1
x¯ji (mod q)
yi = yli = y
0
i +
l∑
j=1
y¯ji (mod q)
si = sli = s
0
i +
l∑
j=1
s¯ji (mod q)
For each ballot form, an onion pair is printed at the bottom,
as shown in Figure 8. If all clerks are honest, the two onions
in a ballot form will contain the same seed value. The onion
in the left hand column is encrypted using public key βR, thus
the voting machine can decrypt it and retrieve the seed value.
The onion in the right hand column can be decoded only by
a quorum of tellers.
3) Voter experience: The voter experience is similar to the
description of the previous section. An additional task for
the voter is to insert the left hand column into the voting
machine, which will read the onion, decode it and print the
corresponding candidate list on the ballot form. The candidate
9Fig. 8. A blank ballot form example
list is determined by si (mod v), where v is the number of
candidates. After that, the voter marks her choice and cast
her vote as normal. A vote example can be illustrated as in
Figure 9.
Fig. 9. A vote example
4) Ballot tallying: After the election, all received votes are
collected from the bulletin board. For each vote, the election
officials will first perform some calculation to absorb the
voter’s choice index value ι into the onion as
(αyi , βT yi · γι · γ−si) = (αyi , βT yi · γι−si)
The above calculation is done publicly. These encrypted values
will then be inserted into a sequence of mixnets, which will
shuffle and re-encrypt these terms by changing the randomisa-
tions while leaving the seed values untouched. Following this
stage, the outputs of the mix network will be decoded by a
quorum of tellers in a threshold fashion. Finally, the decrypted
votes will be tallied and the election result will be announced.
5) Auditing the ballot tallying phase: The above ballot
tallying phase also can be audited using RPC. However, in
this case RPC needs to be run several times. The purpose
is to provide a proof of correct operation. Otherwise, if the
RPC only provides strong evidence, voter privacy might be
violated without being detected if adversaries apply the attacks
in [44]. Instead, if exponential ElGamal cipher is used in the
re-encryption mixes, we can use either the Furukawa-Sako
mix [23] or Neff’s mix [36], [38] to challenge the mix. For
Paillier re-encryption mixes, the techniques in [39], [43] can
be applied.
6) Handling ranked elections: The above protocol does
not directly handle ranked elections because the candidate
ordering is restricted to cyclic shifts rather than permutations
of the canonical ordering. However, some of its later improve-
ments can be implemented in ranked elections. For example,
the techniques in [54] give a general method by which all
election methods can be handled using re-encryption mixnets.
Election systems with information-rich votes, such as STV
and Condorcet, however, will still be vulnerable to the Italian
attack. More recently, Heather (in [26]) and Teague et al.
(in [53]) have shown how to implement STV elections in such
a way as to counter the Italian attack.
V. THREAT ANALYSIS OF PREˆT A` VOTER
We now briefly analyze the two Preˆt a` Voter protocols
with respect to the requirements proposed in Section I. For
simplicity, Preˆt a` Voter with decryption mixes is denoted as
PAV 2005 and the one based on re-encryption mixes is denoted
as PAV 2006.
• Integrity: We first argue that both Preˆt a` Voter protocols
achieve the integrity property if all involved parties are
honest. For every ballot form that has been properly
generated, the onion in the right hand column can be
used to reconstruct the candidate ordering in the left
hand column. Thus any vote which contains the onion
and the voter’s choice index can be used to derive this
voter’s intent. Hence both schemes are able to ensure cast
as intended. Also, if a voter’s vote has been correctly
displayed on the bulletin board, she can be ensured that
her vote is recorded as cast. Furthermore, both schemes
achieve counted as recorded because if all received votes
are properly tallied (including shuffle and decryption),
the counting of the tally outputs will reveal the election
result.
• Verifiability: The verifiability property ensures that all
involved parties have to behave honestly. Otherwise, their
cheating behaviour will be detected with overwhelming
probability. In any case if cheating behaviour is detected,
dishonest parties will be removed and their role will
be implemented by other parties. To see why both Preˆt
a` Voter schemes have achieved individual verifiability,
recall that each authenticated voter can be provided with
a number of ballot forms, and she can randomly choose
one ballot to cast her vote and challenge the other ones.
Even in the case where a voter is provided with only two
ballots, if one of her ballots is not properly constructed,
she has a 50% chance of detecting cheating. Hence any
attempt to cheat in more than a very small number of
ballots would surely be detected. Furthermore, each voter
will be provided with a receipt which contains her vote.
She can check whether her receipt has been correctly
displayed on the bulletin board. Otherwise, her receipt
can be used as a proof to challenge the election. There-
fore, both Preˆt a` Voter protocols enable voters to verify
by themselves that their votes are correctly recorded in
the election systems. In both Preˆt a` Voter protocols, the
receipts are tallied using mixnets. Public verifiability can
be achieved because it can be publicly verified that the
mixnets act honestly, and therefore that the encrypted
votes are correctly transformed into the decrypted votes.
• Anonymity: The anonymity property contains three lev-
els of assurance. Coercion-resistance implies receipt-
freeness, which implies voter privacy. Generally speak-
ing, all Preˆt a` Voter systems only achieve voter pri-
vacy and receipt-freeness. (Coercion-resistance can be
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achieved in the JCJ-style remote voting [31].) In Preˆt a`
Voter schemes, voters are required to cast their votes in a
secure voting booth. When a voter is casting her votes, the
entire ballot form is available for her. Thus only the voter
herself knows how she has voted. Afterwards, although
each voter will be provided with a receipt, it cannot be
used to prove others how she has voted. Therefore, both
schemes provide some assurance of voter privacy and
receipt-freeness.
• Robustness: There are various aspects of robustness. Both
Preˆt a` Voter schemes achieve a high level of robustness
against faulty election authorities. In PAV 2005, if any
mix server is found cheating, it will be removed and
its role will be simulated by a quorum Q of other mix
servers. Therefore, as long as there are at least Q honest
mix servers, the correct result will always be output. In
PAV 2006, if any mix server is found cheating, she can
be simply ignored or she can be replaced by another
party. Moreover, if there are at least Q honest tellers, the
outputs of the mixnet will always be correctly decrypted.
However, there are other issues related to the property
of robustness in the practical aspects of implementation,
and they are future work.
• Usability: The usability of both schemes is very good.
Voters do not need any special knowledge or ability to
cast their votes, and their mandatory tasks have been re-
duced to the minimum: just vote-and-go. Also, the ballot
form layout is familiar to voters’ previous experience.
Furthermore, it is easy for the election authorities to set
up and control the election system.
• Versatility: PAV 2005 is very versatile. It can implement
not only FPTP elections, but also approval voting, Borda
Count voting, STV and Condorcet voting as well. Al-
though PAV 2006 in its original form can be used only
for FPTP elections, some of its adaptations have shown
how the scheme can be extended to handle other election
methods.
A. Vulnerabilities
Although we have illustrated that both Preˆt a` Voter protocols
have achieved most of the desired properties, they still suffer
several vulnerabilities.
• Authority knowledge attack: Only PAV 2005 suffers this
attack, because all ballot forms are generated by a single
election authority. If this party is dishonest, she can not
only learn how a voter has voted just from the receipt, but
also can apply the subliminal & Kleptographic channel
attack [32] to enable her colluding parties to have such
power. The 2006 version and later versions counter this
by introducing distributed constructions for the ballot
forms.
• Discarded receipt attack: This attack is suffered in both
Preˆt a` Voter protocols. Voters need to use their receipts
to check whether their votes are correctly recorded by
the election system. Thus if some voters have discarded
their receipts, adversaries may safely display their votes
incorrectly on the bulletin board without being accused.
To resolve this problem, we could use a Voter-Verifiable
Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) [35], or techniques specifi-
cally designed for Preˆt a` Voter in [34].
• Chain voting attack: This attack is applicable only if all
ballot forms are printed before the election. If adversaries
successfully smuggle a blank ballot form out of the voting
booth, they can use this ballot to coerce a large number
of voters. The adversaries force or bribe a voter to vote
in a particular way using this ballot and bring out another
blank ballot form. Thus after this voter has cast her
vote, the adversaries still have a blank ballot form. They
can repeat this attack to coerce other voters. But if all
ballot forms are printed on-demand, it will be much more
difficult for adversaries to launch this attack.
• Italian attack: PAV 2005 for ranked elections is vul-
nerable to the Italian attack simply because it involves
publication of all decrypted votes. (PAV 2006 cannot
support ranked elections in its original form, and so the
issue does not arise.)
• Randomisation attack: Both Preˆt a` Voter protocols suffer
this attack. Adversaries can coerce voters to bring out
their receipts with the choice marks always at the top.
Although they do not know how these voters have cast
their votes, they make these voters vote in a random
manner.
B. Comparison of the two approaches
Now, we give a brief comparison of the above two ap-
proaches. Compared with PAV 2005, PAV 2006 has the
following advantages:
• In PAV 2006, the shuffle phase and the decryption phase
are separated, and the parties who execute the shuffle
phase do not need to know the private key. Thus if some
of them are absent in the mix, we can simply ignore
them and replace them by some other parties. In contrast,
the absence of any mix server in PAV 2005 will require
expensive strategies to recover the private key share of
the absent mix server.
• In PAV 2006, the size of the onion is constant. In contrast,
it is proportional to the number of mix servers in PAV
2005.
• In PAV 2006, all ballot forms are generated by a number
of clerks in a distributed fashion. If there exists at least
one honest clerk, the privacy of ballot forms can be
properly preserved. In contrast, all ballot forms in PAV
2005 are constructed by a single party. Thus this party
can break the privacy of all ballot forms. Furthermore, she
can apply subliminal & Kleptographic channel attacks to
enable colluding parties to break voter privacy.
• In PAV 2005, if adversaries can smuggle a blank ballot
form (as shown in Figure 5) out of the polling station,
they can coerce a lot of voters using the chain voting
attack. PAV 2005 also has chain of custody issues. But
in PAV 2006, all ballot forms can be printed on-demand.
Thus this scheme provides better assurance against chain
voting attacks and chain of custody issues.
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VI. DISCUSSION
We have discussed the challenges in designing a verifiable,
secret ballot voting scheme and presented the design philos-
ophy of Preˆt a` Voter. We have sought to illustrate the key
steps in the evolution of Preˆt a` Voter and their motivation,
without seeking to give an exhaustive history. The design
has evolved significantly from the original version presented
in [47]. This evolution has been driven in part by a desire to
improve the design, in part in response to the identification
of vulnerabilities. Some design decisions lead to clear-cut
improvements, some give rise to rather subtle trade-offs. A
prime example is the trade-off between pre-printed and on-
demand ballots. The former allows for auditing of ballot forms
prior to the election, and so to a generally easier process,
but requires careful chain of custody mechanisms to ensure
accuracy and privacy. The latter avoids the chain of custody
problems but requires mechanisms, typically cut-and-choose
style protocols, to detect malfunctions or malfeasance by the
booth printing device.
The design of Preˆt a` Voter has been driven by the aim to
make the voter experience as simple and familiar as possible
while providing high levels of transparency and auditability.
The Preˆt a` Voter approach has spawned a suite of trustworthy
schemes while also providing voters with a voting experience
almost identical with currently existing manual systems. It is
also very flexible and adaptable, being capable of supporting a
number of different tallying methods. As such, it would appear
to be one of the strongest contenders for a deployable scheme.
A number of challenges remain. One technical point stems
from the observation that with the original, RSA based,
decryption mix version it is straightforward to deal with
full permutations of the candidates on the ballot forms, at
least if we set aside issues arising from Italian-style attacks.
Whether it is possible to handle full permutations with the
re-encryption mix versions without multiplying the number
of onions remains an open question. We have shown how
cyclic shifts can be handled with re-encryption mixes. While
this appears to be satisfactory for simple, single choice of
candidate elections, it is clearly not suitable for ranked or
approval elections.
Even for a choice of a single candidate, cyclic shifts feel
rather fragile in that, if an adversary does have a way to alter
receipts in an undetectable way, he has a simple way to effect
a predicable shift in the semantics of receipts. Suppose that
the adversary knows that a majority of votes will be cast for
candidate A and he wishes to swing the election in favour
of candidate C; he simply applies a cyclic shift of 2 to the
position of the × on a suitable proportion of the receipts. Of
course, the audit mechanisms should catch such manipulation,
but in the spirit of deploying a strategy of layered defence, it
is desirable to avoid this possibility.
It turns out that we can do better than just cyclic shifts
with re-encryption mixes and prevent this bias attack, as
shown in [53]. Here, the set of permutations allowable on the
ballots is enriched using permutations derived from Florentine
squares. The result is that for any receipt, any shift in the
position of the × will be as likely to change the vote to one
candidate as another. Consequently, by trying to shift the ×,
the adversary can at best randomize a proportion of the votes
and so shift the outcome toward a draw.
In this paper we have sought to provide informal arguments
that the scheme provides the claimed properties, primarily
of accuracy and ballot secrecy. Such arguments are typically
based on known results about cryptographic algorithms and
protocols (in particular, mixes). All this forms part of the
broader issue of developing more formal and systematic ways
to analyse voting schemes. This is still a rather new area
of research and what work has been published is typically
focused on certain formal properties of the cryptographic core
of the schemes. To date there is no consensus as to the
the precise definitions of the properties that a voting system
should provide. Furthermore, there is to date very little work
addressing voting systems as socio-technical systems, taking
account not just of the core algorithms and protocols but also
of the roles of the various, procedures, and so on.
We have sought to demonstrate that the Preˆt a` Voter ap-
proach is a fruitful, flexible and promising one in the search
to develop trustworthy, practical and, we hope, trusted voting
schemes.
A. Future Directions
A number of issues call for further research. Some of
these are quite general issues, facing the verifiable voting
community in general, and some are specific to Preˆt a` Voter-
based systems. First, more systematic and formal analysis
techniques and tools need to be developed to deal with high-
assurance voting systems.
More work needs to be done in exploring efficient and
usable versions of Preˆt a` Voter to deal with a larger class of
voting systems—STV, approval, Borda Count, Condorcet—in
a way that avoids Italian-style attacks.
A number of vulnerabilities have been identified. For these,
counter-measures have been proposed, but in many cases these
either introduce extra complexity into the voting process or
leave further vulnerabilities. A prime example of this is the
requirement to ensure that it is not possible for the voter
to retain any proof of the candidate order associated with
their receipt. Various counter-measures have been proposed.
Arguably the most pleasing is to ensure a supply of decoy
left hand strips so that if the voter does attempt to smuggle
the strip out of the booth this will not constitute a proof to a
coercer.
The MarkPledge approach is interesting in this context in
that it avoids the need to destroy information in the process
of forming the receipt. Rather, the information is masked by
additional faked information. It would be very satisfying to
find a way of incorporating such an approach in Preˆt a` Voter,
but it is far from clear how this can be done without excessive
complexity.
To date, the Preˆt a` Voter program has concentrated on
supervised voting, where voters cast their vote in the enforced
privacy of a booth in a polling station. There is considerable
interest in allowing remote voting via various channels such as
the internet or telephone. While there are obvious attractions
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in terms of convenience in such remote voting, there are
serious concerns about how one counters threats of coercion
and vote buying in such a context. To date, no satisfactory
solution to such threats appears to exist. Some proposals have
been made—notably that of Juels, Catano and Jackobson [31],
and Clarkson et al. [13] and Traore et al. [4]—that appear
technically sound, but from a usability and user perception
point of view they are likely to be problematic.
Nonetheless, while most experts remain wary of proposing
the use of remote voting for politically binding elections [17],
it is clearly interesting to explore remote schemes and there
are likely to be contexts in which the coercion threats can
be disregarded (for example, the election of officials to
professional organisations). Remote variants of Preˆt a` Voter
are being investigated including the Pretty Good Democracy
scheme [49], that combines ideas from code voting and Preˆt
a` Voter.
Another issue that has been rather neglected by the verifi-
able voting community is that of how one actually implements
the concept of the secure bulletin board. Most of the literature
simply assumes that such a primitive exists or at least can be
implemented.
Even if one succeeds in designing a scheme that is trust-
worthy, the challenge remains to persuade the stakeholders that
they should trust and use the system. This is true of any new
technology but is especially challenging for verifiable schemes
such as Preˆt a` Voter. First, it is essential that the system
achieves close to universal acceptance by the electorate as well
as election officials and politicians. Secondly, such systems
make heavy use of cryptography which, by its very nature, is
rather mysterious and daunting. How to convey sufficient level
of understanding to engender trust remains a major challenge.
B. Related Work
There has been an explosion of activity in recent years in the
area of verifiable voting schemes. The Preˆt a` Voter approach
was inspired by a study of Chaum’s visual cryptographic
scheme [11] and the desire to develop a conceptually and
technologically simpler scheme achieving the same goals.
Around the same time as Chaum’s scheme, Neff proposed
the VoteHere scheme [36], and later MarkPledge [37]. These
are ingenious schemes that provide high degrees of assurance,
especially of the correctness of the encoding of the vote in
the receipts. The drawback is that the voter has to participate
in quite a complicated challenge-response-style protocol with
the booth device to generate the receipt.
Adida and Rivest proposed Scratch and Vote [2], based on
Preˆt a` Voter but using homomorphic tabulation and proposing
the use of scratch strips to allow off-line auditing of ballots.
Bingo Voting [8] is another recent and interesting approach.
The idea here is that on the receipt there is a random-looking
string against each candidate. For the chosen candidate the
string is drawn from a pool of pre-assigned codes. The strings
against the non-chosen candidates are chosen at random using
a trusted random number generator. The approach is ingenious
but does rely on trust in the random numder generation, and
it is difficult for voters to confirm that their vote is correctly
encoded.
One response to the observation that the use of cryptography
is likely to be an inhibiting factor in the uptake of verifiable
schemes is to explore schemes that achieve similar levels of
verifiability but without the use of cryptography. An early
effort in this direction is Randell and Ryan’s scheme [45],
which is based on Preˆt a` Voter but uses scratch strips to
mimic the effect of cryptography. Another approach is Rivest’s
ThreeBallot scheme [46], in which the vote is encoded across
three ballots, only one of which is kept as the receipt. Yet
another approach is the Farnel based schemes [3], which rest
on the observation that verifiability does not require the voter
to retain a copy of the her own receipt. Accordingly, the
Farnel schemes propose mechanisms that allow voters to be
given a copy of one or more previously generated receipts.
Thus the anonymization occurs up front, rather than later
in the mix/tabulation phase. In practice, implementing the
shuffling of receipts before they are passed out to the voters is
difficult without a significant level of trust in procedures and
mechanical devices.
These non-cryptographic schemes are interesting in that
they do not require an understanding of cryptographic mech-
anisms. Nonetheless, the assurance arguments are still quite
subtle, more subtle than those associated with conventional
voting systems. Vulnerabilities in all three of these schemes
have been identified and they do not achieve the same levels
of assurance of the more advanced cryptographic schemes.
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